Mercer Law Review
Volume 1

Number 1

Article 2

12-1949

Injunctive Law Enforcement: Leaven or Secret Weapon
Frank E. Maloney

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Common Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons

Recommended Citation
Maloney, Frank E. (1949) "Injunctive Law Enforcement: Leaven or Secret Weapon," Mercer Law Review:
Vol. 1: No. 1, Article 2.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol1/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

MERCER LAW REVIEW
VOLUME I

FALL 1949

NUMBER I

INJUNCTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT:
LEAVEN OR SECRET WEAPON
By FRANK E. MALONEY*
"The extension of equity jurisdiction to prevent crime, under the
guise of enjoining a 'nuisance,' is really a matter of grave concern."**
I. THE PROBLEM

THE historical development of English law resulted in the division
of the law into three main branches: common law, equity, and
criminal law. The common law as administered by the king's court
developed into a rigid system of formal actions, with relief by way
of money damages as the one remedy in personal actions. This development, together with the growth of highly technical rules of
pleading, left many situations in which no adequate relief was available in those courts; and the resulting inflexibility of the system led
to the growth of equity, under which the king's prerogative might
be exercised to provide justice in such situations.'
As a result of jurisdictional conflicts between the common-law
courts and chancery, the chancery courts soon limited their relief almost entirely to situations in which property rights were in need of
protection and no adequate relief could be found in the common-law
courts.! The early chancellors were governed largely by conscience
rather than precedent. In modern times, however, equity has become
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida.
**GLENN AND REDDEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUITY 408 (1946). The recent summons of Garrard Glenn by the Supreme Chancellor was a real loss to the cause of equity in the United States.
It is only fitting to note here that this quotation from Professor Glenn's casebook was the inspiration for this article.
1. 6 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 215 (6th ed. 1938); Adams, The Origin of English
Equity, 16 COL. L. REV. 87, 98 (1916); Barbour, Some Aspects of Fifteenth Century Chancery,
31 HARV. L. REV. 834, 859 (1918).
2. Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swan, 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818). This limitation has been under constant
attack in the United States since the turn of the century and has resulted in introducing great
ambiguity into the meaning of the term "property rights." See De Funiak, Equitable Protection
of Personal or Individual Rights, 36 KY. L. J. 7 (1947); Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personalty, 29 HARV. L. REV. 640 (1916); Walsh, Equitable Protection
of Personal Rights, 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 878 (1930); Warren and Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
3. Winder, Precedent in Equity, 57 L. Q. REV. 245, 246 (1941).
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a legal system governed by rules and principles established by prior
decisions in the same way in which the common-law courts are so
governed. Along with this development came agitation for simplification of legal procedure by the elimination of the separate rules of
pleading governing the systems in the common law and chancery
courts. This agitation led in turn to the merger of law and equity in
England4 and in the federal' and most of the state courts' of the
United States. Despite this fus'ion, however, the distinctions between
law and equity have continued as to the method of trial, the type of
relief granted, and even as to the review on appeal.7 The expansion
of one type of equitable relief, the enjoining of criminal acts, into a
potent enforcement weapon in fields previously regarded as essentially civil, is the subject of this article.
While the common law and equity courts were working out the
protection of individual rights, the third branch of law, the criminal
law, was being developed for the protection of society against crime
or wilful attempts by individuals to interfere with the existing social
order.' Prevention of such conduct was sought through punitive action
by the king or the state for the purpose of discouraging this type of
wrong-doing The underlying basis for such punishment was the
moral responsibility of the wrongdoer." In this developing criminal
law system, alleged criminal wrongdoers very early became entitled
to a trial by jury on the question of their guilt or innocence."
Meanwhile, one of the main purposes of equity had come to be the
protection of individual property rights; and one of the principal
methods by which it gave such protection was through the use of the
injunction. 2 It was soon recognized that this equitable remedy by way
4. Common Law Procedure Act of 1854, followed by Lord Cairn's Act in 1858, 17, 18 VlCr., c. 125,
Secs. 68, 79, 83.
5. FED. R. Civ. P., 28 U. S. C. following Sec. 723 (c) (1946).
6. Today 32 states have adopted code pleading: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri. Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Five of these states, however, Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, and Oregon, have
retained a formal distinction between law and equity. Fifteen of the remaining sixteen states,
Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia and West Virginia, retain the
distinction between law and equity to a greater or lesser degree, although only five,Alabama,
Arkansas, Delaware, Tennessee, Mississippi and Vermont, retain separate equity courts; in
the others law and equity are administered on separate "sides" of the same court. Louisiana,
following the civillaw, of course stands in a category by herself. See CLARK, CODE PLEADINGS
Sec. 8 (2d ed. 1947).
7. Glenn, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV. 753, 757 (1946).
8. BRASOL, THE ELEMENTS OF CRIME 30 (1927).
9. MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW Sec. 3 (1934).
10. State v. Doud, 7 Conn. 384 (1829); 2 BRACTON, LEGIBUS 263, 473 (Twiss ed. 1879).
11. The jury system has been accredited to the Magna Charta executed by King John of England
in the year 1215. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 349 (1898); 2 BL. COMM. *349. Later writers have
cast doubt on this claim. 1 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 141, 142 (2d
ed. 1905). But there is no doubt as to its early origin and the veneration in which it has been
held by the English people. See Hatcher, Magna Charta and the Jury System, 24 A. B. A. J.
555 (1938).
12. Injunctions fall into three general classifications: temporary restraining orders, temporary injunctions or injunctions pendente lite,and permanent injunctions. For an explanation of each
of these types of injunction, see note 113 infra.

19491

INJUNCTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT

of injuntion might offer a more efficient means of protection against
certain types of crime than the traditional punishment after the
event provided for in the criminal courts. This possibility of injunctive relief posed a number of basic problems concerning the legality
and the advisability of equitable expansion into the field of crimeprevention through the use of injunctions against criminal acts, and
thereafter into new civil fields including the administrative, corporate
and labor branches, as a means of accomplishing socially desirable
results.

II. HisTORICAL

BACKGROUND

Originally the Court of Chancery did to some extent enforce the
criminal as well as the civil law.' This was especially true in those
cases in which the local courts were overawed by the powerful local
barons. This jurisdiction of the chancery court was unpopular, particularly because that court had no provisions for jury trial; and, as
the English government became more stable and the courts of law
more able to render justice in such situations, equity gradually relinquished its criminal jurisdiction, so that by the end of the fifteenth
century it had entirely ceased to administer criminal law.14 Meanwhile, the King's Counsel, which later became known as the Court of
Star Chamber, had concurrent jurisdiction with the chancellor; and
this court relinquished its criminal jurisdiction more slowly. Its summary methods of trying criminals, particularly in libel cases, rendered
it so odious to the English people that it was abolished in 1640.l
These abuses in the Court of Star Chamber resulted in such ingrained distrust of the exercise of criminal jurisdiction without a jury
as to prevent the revival of criminal equity jurisdiction in England. 6
But, in the absence of the historical example of such abuses, the revival of criminal equity in the United States has met little opposition.
Even in the United States equity refuses to enforce the criminal
law as such," though it has become accepted practice to enjoin offenses
that are both crimes and nuisances ;"s and the fact that the threatened
injury may also be a crime is not looked upon as a sufficient ground for
13. For examples see SELECT CASES IN CHANCERY, SELDEN SOCIETY PUBLICATIONS, Nos. 5, 17, 23, 70.
See also Mack, The Revival of Criminal Equity, 16 HARV. L. REV. 389, 390-391 (1903).
14. 1 SPENCE, EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY, 689 (1846); cf. I STORY. EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE Sec. 48 (13th ed. Bigelow, 1886).
15. 16 CAR. I, c. 10 (1640).
16. GLENN AND REDDEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUITY 409 n. (1946).
17. City of Malden v. Flynn, 318 Mass. 276, 61 N. E. 2d 107 (1945); Mears v. Colonial Beach, 166 Va.
278. 184 S. E. 175 (1936); 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE See. 1347 (5th ed. Symons, 1941).
18. United States v. American Bond & Mtg. Co., 31 F. 2d 448 (N. D. II. 1929), aff'd, 52 F. 2d 318
(C.C.A. 7th 1931), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 374 (1931); People v. Brophy, 49 Cal. App. 2d 15,
120 P. 2d-946 (1942); 4 POMEROY, op. cit. supra note 17, Sec. 1349.
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the prevention of an injunction. 9 The avoidance of criminal punishment by one means or another2" has led to considerable pressure for
such equitable relief. Moreover, concentration of population has
greatly increased the need for speedy protection in matters of health
and police, 2 and equity has stepped into the breach. In the beginning
there was a feeling on the part of the judiciary that this use of the
injunction might bring equity into disrepute with the people," but the
courts have long since forgotten the admonition against such practice
made by Chancellor Kent of New York in l817,23 and the question
today has become how far and in what direction this new-found equity
jurisdiction will extend. It is the purpose of this article to examine
this extension, after pointing out the bases on which such injunctions
have been held constitutional, with particular emphasis on the reaction
of labor and the lack of reaction in other quarters. It is then proposed
to examine critically the advantages and disadvantages of law enforcement by injunction and the feasibility of possible alternatives to
equitable intervention.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY

The most obvious effect of law enforcement by injunction is the
deprivation of the enjoined individual of a trial by jury. The injunction itself is granted without jury trial; and if the individual enjoined
chooses to disobey the injunction he will be cited for contempt and
will be denied a jury trial in the contempt proceedings." This taking
away of the right to a jury trial has been the principal basis of attack on the constitutionality of the use of the injunction as a law enforcement weapon. Injunctive law enforcement has been attacked in
the federal courts as denying the right to trial by jury guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution," and in
state courts on the basis that it violates either the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution2 1 or state constitutional pro19. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895); State v. Howat, 109 Kan. 376, 198 Pac. 686 (1921); Common-wealth v. McGovern, 116 Ky. 212, 75 S. W. 261 (1903); 5 PomERoy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE Sec.
1890 (2d ed. 1919).
20. "Criminal justice may be defeated by (a) politics, (b) judicial laziness involving short hours
and many days of leisure, (c) the undesirable hangers-on, (d) the restricted bar, (e) failure
of prosecutors to prepare their cases properly, (f) the search warrant racket, (g) the indictment racket, (h) the adjournment racket, (i) the failure of witnesses to obey subpoenas, (j)
force, as in cases of lynching and the third degree, psychological or otherwise, (k) control of
the law enforcement unit by gangland, (1) 'kangaroo courts,' (m) law enforcement that neither
eradicates crime nor endeavors to reform the criminal." Pollitt, The Defeat of Justice, 23 FLA.
L. J. 118, 131 (1949).
21. See Simpson, FIFTY YEARS OF AMERICAN EQUITY, 50 HARV. L. REV. 171, 224 (1936).
22. Attorney General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 371, 391 (N. Y. 1817).
23. ibid.
24. Eilenbecker v. District Ct. of Plymouth County, 134 U. S. 31, 36 (1890); see 15 U. OF CHI. L.
REV. 669, 682 (1948).
25. U. S. CONST. AMEND. VI, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed . . ."
nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
26. U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, See. 1: "...
or property, without due process of law; . . ."
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visions for jury trials." In tne face of this attack, the issuance of
such injunctions by the equity court has been held constitutional by
almost all American courts, so that today the constitutionality of
law enforcement by injunction seems beyond question. The use of the
injunction has been sustained on one of three grounds: that enjoining the nuisance, whether a common-law nuisance or one set
forth by statute, involves merely an extension of the permissible
equity jurisdiction to enjoin public nuisances;' that the jurisdiction
is preventive only and not punitive;" or that conduct declared unlawful by a particular statute is not within the class of controversies
requiring a jury trial under the Constitution. In this last category the
courts assume that no constitutional problem is presented, as, for
example, in the use of the injunction to enforce the Interstate Commerce Act.2
IV ., DIRECTIONS OF EXPANSION
The foundation for the re-entry of equity into the field of criminal
law was probably laid by an English case granting an injunction
against a purpresture 1 In such cases the property interest involved
was clear, and hence it was easy for chancery to grant preventive relief. This extension2 of equitable jurisdiction was quickly adopted in
the United States.
The use of the injunction in labor disputes likewise originated in
England with the case of Springhead Spinning Company v. Reily"
This jurisdiction, repudiated in England in a later case,3" was widely
27. GA. CONST. Art. 1, See. I, Par. V (1945): "Every person charged with an offense against the
laws of this state . . . shall have a public and speedy trial by an impartial jury." FLA. CONST.
Decl. of Rights, Sec. 11: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
28. Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa 488, 22 N. W. 641 (1885); Chase v. Revere House, 232 Mass. 88, 122
N. E. 162 (1919). There has been one vigorous dissent, in a New Jersey case involving a liquor
nuisance statute, in which the Court said: "It is clear that if the legislature may bestow on the
Court of Chancery jurisdiction to grant an injunction and abate a public nuisance of a purely
criminal nature, then there can be no valid argument against the power of the legislature to
confide the entire Criminal Code of this state to a court of equity for enforcement. It is apparent
that such a court would render nugatory the provisions of the Constitution, which guarantees
the right of a presentment by a grand jury, and a trial by jury, to one accused of crime." Hedden v. Hand, 90 N. J. Eq. 583, 593, 107 Atl. 285, 290 (1919). The decision is somewhat weakened,
however, by the fact that it rests partly on a provision of the then current New Jersey Constitution defining the jurisdiction of chancery courts in New Jersey.
29. See State ex rel. Attorney General v. Canty, 207 Mo. 439, 105 S. W. 1078, 1085 (1907). Valiant,
P. J., in a concurring opinion uses the following language: "A man who has not yet acted, but
who proposes to commit an act, which is not only criminal in its nature but also flagrantly
offensive as a public nuisance, has no constitutional right to commit the act in order that he
may thereafter enjoy the constitutional right of a trial by jury."
30. Texas & P. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 162 U. S. 197 (1896), Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 at 48-49 (1937), where the court employs similar reasoning in
sustaining the constitutionality of a statutory proceeding under the National Labor Relations
Act for reinstatement of an employee and payment for time lost against objection to assessment
of the latter element without a jury trial.
31. Attorney General v. Richards, 2 Anstruther 603, 145 Eng. Rep. 980 (1795). A purpresture has
been defined as "an inclosure by a private party of a part of that which belongs to and ought
to be open and free to the enjoyment of the public at large." Attorney General v. Evart Booming
Co., 34 Mich. 462. 472 (1876).
32. Mayor of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 12 Pet. 91 (U. S. 1848); State v. Mobile, 5 Port.
279 (Ala. 1837): Mayor of Columbus v. Jaques, 30 Ga. 506 (1860): People v. St. Louis, 10 III.
351 (1818). For a more modern example of the same type of injunction, see State v. Nelson, 189
Minn. 87, 248 N. W. 751 (1933).
33. L. R. 6 Eq. 551 (1868). The court claimed jurisdiction to grant an injunction against posting
placards urging workers to strike on the basis of protecting property against destruction.
34. Prudential Assur. Co. v. Knott. 10 Ch. App. 142 (1875).
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accepted in the United States, and it will be dealt with more fully in
the next section of this article.
From these beginnings criminal equity in the United States has
stretched out its tentacles, octopus-like, in all directions, but, to quote
a current authority on equity, "the gradualness of the extension has
facilitated its acceptance." 35
Perhaps the broadest extension has been in the field of nuisance.
The concept of a nuisance was extended from its earlier narrow
limitation to situations involving injury to land or incorporeal
hereditaments " to those resulting in injury to public health or morals.
This extension began in cases involving the orthodox property concept, when individuals sought injunctions against houses of prostitution because they impaired the value of neighboring real property. 7
Soon courts were allowing the state rather than the aggrieved individual to enjoin such conduct, apparently overlooking the fact that
no property rights were involved. 8 Other jurisdictions, however, refused to entertain bills filed by the state in such cases in the absence of
statutory authority."9 The state legislatures were not slow to grasp
the invitation implicit in these cases, and many states enacted statutes
declaring saloons and brothels to be nuisances and providing for
suits by the state to enjoin them." This movement was given a tremendous impetus in the so-called prohibition era,4 1 and the courts
have not stopped with enjoining saloons. Gambling establishments,42
the conduct of prize fights,43 and even bull fights," have felt the weight
of the injunction, sometimes in the absence of statutory authority,
although a few states have refused to sanction such injunctions in
the absence of legislative authorization.4
Equity also expanded into the field of public health at an early
date,46 and this jurisdiction today includes supervision of such various
35. Leflar, Equitable Prevention of Public Wrongs, 14 TEx. L. REV. 427, 442 (1936).
36. Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction (Part II), 1 HARV. L. REV. 111, 128 (1887);
McRae, The Development of Nuisance in the Early Common Law, 1 U. OF FLA. L. REV. 27 (1948).
37. Hamilton v. Whitridge, 11 Md. 128 (1857); Cranford v. Tyrrell, 128 N. Y. 341, 28 N. E. 514
(1891).
38. State v. Fegar, 102 Ga. 274, 29 S. E. 463 (1897) (evasion of liquor law); Columbian Athletic
Club v. State, 143 Ind. 98, 40 N. E. 914 (1895).
39. State v. Patterson, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 465, 37 S. W. 478 (1896): "The mere fact that the law
against the offense is not enforced or observed is no ground for the interference of a court of
equity."
40. Note, "Red Light" Injunction and Abatement Acts, 20 COL. L. REV. 605 (1920), collects the early
statutes and cases involving houses of ill fame. Rounds, Injunctions Against Liquor Nuisances.
9 HARV. L. REV. 521 (1896), and Scholfield. Equity Jurisdiction to Abate and Enjoin Illegal Saloons as Public Nuisances, 8 ILL. L. RFV. 19 (1913) collect the earlier liquor nuisance cases.
41. See Black, The Expansion of Criminal Equity under Prohibition, 5 Wis. L. REV. 412 (1930).
42. Valdez v. State, 123 Fla. 142, 194 So. 388 (1940); Gullatt v. State ex rel. Collins, 169 Ga. 680,
150 S. E. 825 (1929); Chicago Fair Grounds Ass'n v. People, 60 Ill. App. 488 (1895); cf. Federal Amusement Co. v. State, 159 Fla. 495, 32 So. 2d 1 (1947) (injunction against operation of a
night club where men impersonated women "in a suggestive, indecent and obscene manner").
43. Commonwealth v. McGovern, 116 Ky. 212. 75 S. W. 261 (1903).
44. State ex rel. Crow v. Canty, 207 Mo. 439, 105 S. W. 1078 (1907).
45. State v. Brush, 318 Ill. 307. 149 N. E. 262 (1925); State v. Ehrlich, 65 W. Va. 700, 64 S. E. 935
(1909).
46. Attorney General v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp., 133 Mass. 361 (1882); Attorney General v.
Heatley, (1897) 1 Ch. 560.
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activities as the collection of garbage" and the distribution of milk.48
The illegal practice of various professions has likewise been enjoined, usually on the theory that the right to practice such professions is a property right and that interference with such a right constitutes a public nuisance. Thus injunctions have been granted against
the unauthorized practice of dentistry,4 law,5" medicine, 5 and optometry, 2 4lthough relief has been denied in the case of some of the borderline professions, such as chiropody 3 and chiropractic. 4 It is interesting to note that some of the more recent cases in these fields have
justified the injunction on the basis of protecting the public from the
harmful conduct of the defendant rather than on that of protection of
property rights."
Perhaps the farthest extension of the public-nuisance concept is in
instances in which equity has enjoined the violation of usury laws by
a small loan business." At least two courts have refused to extend the
concept this far. 7 The final step in some jurisdictions has been the
passage of statutes allowing private persons to start proceedings
against specified public nuisances. 8
Another situation that saw the early intervention of the chancery
courts was the restraining of the ultra vires acts of private corporations. Dean Pound in an excellent article, "Visitatorial Jurisdiction
over Corporations in Equity,"" traces this development to an early
Irish case.6 ' Jurisdiction was based on the power of the king as
parens patriae, and such jurisdiction has descended to our American
courts. It does not depend on the protection of any property right, a
fact that was forcibly brought out by the Supreme Court of Georgia
47. Jansen Farms v. Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 138, 171 N. E. 199 (1930); Board of Health v. Vink, 184
Mich. 688, 151 N. W. 672 (1915).
48. State ex rel.
Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 118 N. J. Eq. 504, 179 Atl. 116 (1935)
But ef. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Capital Dairy Co., 62 Ohio St. 123, 56 N. E. 651 (1900) (Court
refused injunction to enforce compliance with food analysis act).
49. Kentucky State Board of Dental Exam'rs v. Payne, 213 Ky. 382, 281 S. W. 188 (1926).
50. Dworhen v. Apartment House Owners' Ass'n, 38 Ohio App. 265, 176 N. E. 577 (1931), is perhaps the first case. See Hicks and Katz, Practice of Law by Laymen and Law Agencies, 41
YALE L. J. 69 (1931); 16 MINN. L. REV. 196 (1931); 8 WASH. L. REV. 33 (1933).
51. Sloan v. Mitchell, 113 W. Va. 506, 168 S. E. 800 (1933).
52. Seifert v. Buhl Optical Co., 276 Mich. 692, 268 N. W. 784 (1936), 35 MicH. L. REV. 497 (1937).
53. State v. Maltby, 108 Neb. 578, 188 N. W. 175 (1922).
54. People ex Tel. Chiropractic League v. Steele, 4 Cal. App. 2d. 206, 40 P. 2d 959, rehearing denied, 41 P. 2d 946 (1935); Dean v. State, 151 Ga. 371, 106 S. E. 792 (1921).
55. Depew v. Wichita Retail Credit Ass'n, 141 Kan. 481, 485, 42 P. 2d 214, 217 (1935), suit to enjoin illegal practice of law, in which the court said: ". . . whether or not the interest of the
plaintiffs in their professional capacities is in the nature of a property right, they have . . . a
special privilege, franchise and duty as officers of the court to protect the legal profession, the
courts, and the administration of justice generally." State Bar of Oklahoma v. Retail Credit
Ass'n, 170 Okla. 246, 37 P. 2d 954 (1934).
56. Moore v. Gillian, 141 Fla. 707, 193 So. 751 (1940); State ex tel. Smith v. McMahon, 128 Kan. 772,
280 Pac. 906 (1929); State ex rel. Goff v. O'Neal, 205 Minn. 366, 286 N. W. 316 (1939).
57. People ex tel. Stephens v. Seccombe, 103 Cal. App. 306, 284 Pae. 725 (1930), 18 CALIP. L. REV.
328; State v. Ball Inv. Co., 191 Ga. 382, 12 S. E. 2d 574 (1940), 19 N. C. L. REV. 586 (1941).
58. E.g. FLA. STAT. Sec. 64.11 (1941). Under this statute it has been held unnecessary for the
citizen to show special damages in order to maintain the bill. National Container Corp. v.
State ex rel.Stockton, 138 Fla. 32, 189 So. 4 (1939). The same case is also authority for the
proposition that a citizen may proceed under the statute to enjoin not only an existing nuisance
but also a "threatened" nuisance. Id. at 47, 189 So. at 13.
59. 49 HAHv. L. REV. 369 (1936).
60. Attorney General v. Mayor of Galway, 1 Malloy 95 (Ir. Ch. 1828).
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in an early case. 1 It was apparently first exercised in the United States
to prevent the consolidation of competing railway lines. " As Dean
Pound brings out, this phase of equity jurisdiction is not too frequently
employed today, partly because visitatorial jurisdiction over a corporation exists only in the courts of the state*that chartered it. Thus,
if the corporation violates the law of another state in which it is doing business, the courts of the latter may oust it by quo warranto"3
but cannot supervise its operation through the use of the injunction.
Moreover, equity will not intervene in such cases unless there is danger of injury to the public through mismanagement; 64 and, if such
mismanagement is not affected with the public interest,
the proper
65
remedy is a stockholders' suit for mismanagement.
To date the courts have been conservative in the use of this visitatorial power but, as Pound points out, "We shall do well to remember
that there is a powerful weapon for the protection of the public in
the legal armory waiting to be used effectively in order to meet the
ills of today, even if it has not been needed at other seasons to meet
those of another time."66
Equitable jurisdiction as parens patriae has, however, been extend-,
ed into other fields besides the supervision of corporations; and the
state, acting in this capacity, has protected what Dean Pound calls
social interests" as distinguished from public interests, meaning rights
of the state as owner of property. This jurisdiction seems to stem
from the case of In re Debs, 6 in which the United States Government
sought and obtained an injunction against a railroad strike on the
theory that the United States had a property interest in the mails and
that the stoppage of trains would injure this property right and
would also interfere with interstate commerce. Today our legislatures use this power on a broad scale as a basis for granting the right
61. Trust Co. of Ga. v. State, 109 Ga. 736, 35 S. E. 323 (1900).
62. Trust Co. of Ga. v. State, 109 Ga. 736, 35 S. E. 323 (1900); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Commonwealth, 97 Ky. 675, 31 S. W. 476 (1895), aff'd, 161 U. S. 677 (1896); Pennsylvania R. R. v. Commonwealth, 7 Atl. 374 (Pa. 1886). The jurisdiction is explained in Attorney General v. Railroad
Companies, 35 Wis. 425, 524 (1874), as follows: "The equitable jurisdiction . . . seems to proceed on the presumption that it may better serve the public interest to restrain a corporation,
than to punish it by penal remedies or to forfeit its charter; and that, in that view, the proper
officers of the state should have an election of remedies, . . . the attorney general has a right
of election to resort to the more lenient remedy of injunction, in preference to the harsher and
more dangerous expedient of forfeiture."
63. Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U. S. 270 (1912); State v. Lemp Brewing Co., 79 Kan. 705, 102
Pac. 504 (1909).
64. "But, except in the case of charitable or eleemosynary, and perhaps municipal, corporations
(though the latter exception is denied by some authority . . . ), where the general public are interested in the application of the fund, obviously the state has no legal interest in the management or disposal of'the funds of the corporation." State v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co.,
136 Wis. 179, 186, 116 N. W. 900, 903 (1908): See Stockton v. Central R. R. of N. J., 60 N. J.
Eq. 52, 80, 24 Atl. 964, 974 (1892). But see Ware v. Regent's Canal Co., 3 De Gex & J. 212, 228,
44 Eng. Rep. 1280, 1256 (1858).
65. 10 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS See. 4860 (1931).
66. Pound, Visitatoriol Jurisdiction over Corporations in Equity. 49 HARV. L. REv. 369, 395 (1936).
67. See Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1920, 34 HARe. L. REv. 388, 395 (1921) citing Pound,
An Introduction to American Law, DUNSTER HousE PAPERs No. 3, Cambridge 1920, p. 4.
68. 158 U. S. 564 (1895).
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to use the injunction as an enforcement weapon to federal" and state
agencies." Once the agencies themselves have such power, the injunction is the preferred enforcement weapon," not only because obtaining an injunction requires much less agency time and effort but also
because such offenses against administrative regulations lack the
nefarious character or, as one writer has put it, the "sex appeal"7"
necessary to persuade a jury to bring in a verdict of guilty. 3
One area in which equity is definitely advancing beyond the protection of property rights toward the protection of purely personal

rights of individuals is the field of civil liberties. 4 In most of these
cases in which relief has been granted, a nominal property right has
been used as a basis for protecting the personal right." In 1939, however, in Hague v. CIO 76 the Supreme Court of the United States,
without finding any semblance of a property right, upheld an injunction restraining Mayor Hague from interfering with the rights of

free assembly and speech. The case does not directly establish the
jurisdiction of equity to protect personal rights, since the defendants
argued the question of jurisdiction, based upon the interpretation of a
federal statute,7 rather than on the ground of lack of a property
69. Note, Statutory Injunction as an Enforcement Weapon of Federal Agencies. 57 YALE L. J. 1023,
1024-1025 (1948), provides an up-to-date list of such agencies. They include: The Civil Aeronautics Board, 52 STAT. 1025 (1938), 49 U. S. C. See. 647 (1946); The Federal Security Administrator under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 62 STAT. 1043 (1938). 21 U. S. C. Sec.
332 (1946); the Federal Trade Commission under the Wheeler-Lea Act, 52 STAT. 174 (1938), 15
U. S. C. Sec. 53 (1946); the Interstate Commerce Commission under the Motor Carrier Act, 49
STAT. 664 (1935), 49 U. S. C. Sec. 322(b) (1946); the Market Administrator of the Dept. of
Agriculture, 50 STAT. 246 (1937), 7 U. S. C. See. 608a(6) (1940); the National Labor Relations
Board under the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U. S. C. See. 160(j),(1) (Supp. No.
1 1948); the Securities and Exchange Commission, 48 STAT. 86 (1933), 15 U. S. C. Sec. 77t(b)
(1946) and 48 STAT. 899 (1934), 15 U. S. C. Sec. 78u(e) (1946): and the Wage and Hour Division of the Dept. of Labor under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U. S. C.
Sec. 217 (1946). See also Comment, 32 GEO. L. J. 449 (1944) re use of such power by the OPA
during World War II.
70. Such agencies in Florida include: Commissioner of Agriculture, FLA. STAT. Sec. 578.15 (1941);
State Board of Accountancy, FLA. STAT. Sec. 473.05 (1941); Barbers' Sanitary Commission, FLA.
STAT. Sec. 476.24 (1941); Florida Citrus Commission, FLA. STAT. Sec. 595.13 (1941); State Board
of Dental Examiners. FLA. STAT. Sec. 466.29 (1941); State Board of Engineering Examiners,
FLA. STAT. See. 471.11 (1941); Hotel Commission, FLA. STAT. Sec. 511.31 (1941); State Livestock Sanitary Board, FLA. STAT. Sec. 585.37; State Board of Optometry, FLA. STAT. Sec. 463.19
(1941): State Plant Board, FLA. STAT. Sec. 581.02 (1941); Railroad Commission, FLA. STAT.
Sees. 350.62, 350.65 (1941): Real Estate Commission, FLA. STAT. Sec. 475.39 (1941); and municipal
zoning commissions, FLA. STAT. Sec. 176.23 (1941).
71. E.g., between 1942 and May 1947 the OPA sought nearly five times as many injunctions as it
did criminal prosecutions. Note, The Statutory Injunction as an Enforcement Weapon of Federal Agencies, 57 YALE L. J. 1023, 1033-1034 (1948), gives statistics indicating that during this
period the OPA sought injunctions in 68,894 cases, as compared with 13,915 criminal prosecutions.
72. Note, supra note 71, at 1024.
73. Of 520 OPA cases tried by jury in the fiscal year 1945, 37.7% resulted in acquittal, despite the
fact that the agency prosecuted only flagrant cases. Statistics from Note, supra note 71, at 1035,
n. 49.
74. See Moscovitz, Civil Liberties and Injunctive Protection. 39 ILL. L. REV. 144 (1944). "Civil liberties include those rights of the individual which are guaranted by the first eight and the 13th,
14th, and 15th amendments to the federal constitution . . . the issue has been presented by requests to protect freedom of speech, freedom of religion, the right of assembly, the right to
vote, the immunity from unreasonable search and seizure, and the equal rights of negroes."
75. Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swan. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818); Brinson v. Jackson, 168 Ga. 353, 148
S. E. 96 (1929) (protecting an educational right by enjoining imposition of an invalid matricula(enjoining further debauchtion fee); Stark v. Hamilton, 149 Ga. 227, 99 S. E. 861 (1919)
ment of minor daughter on basis of property right to her services); see 51 YALE L. J. 329 (1922).
76. 307 U. S.496 (1939).
77. 36 STAT. 1092, c. 231, Sec. 24(14) (1911), 28 U. S. C. Sec. 41(14) (1946). This statute has also
been construed to confer jurisdiction on the federal district courts to prevent interference with
freedom of religion. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943), rehearing denied, 319
U. S. 782 (1943) (jurisdiction upheld but injunctive relief denied on the merits).
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right. Subsequent to the Hague case, the lower federal courts have assumed jurisdiction to protect civil liberties in a number of different
situations."8 Some state courts have gone further and assumed jurisdiction to enjoin religious and racial discrimination even without such
statutory authorization."
V. REACTION TO THIS EQUITABLE EXPANSION
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of this expansion of criminal
equity has been the almost complete lack of unfavorable reaction to
the encroachment on the right to a jury trial. True, the individual
affected may and frequently does protest, and perhaps contests the
constitutionality of the injunction on this basis, but the people as a
whole accept and applaud this use of the injunction because of the
speed with which it produces results. The explanation of this attitude
lies, perhaps, in the fact that the jury as a means of administering
justice has fallen into disrepute" to such an extent that in jurisdictions in which a jury trial may be waived, comprising about half of
the states, the option is frequently exercised.8 Moreover, criticism
of the jury system has today reached the point where legal82 and lay 3
writers are openly advocating its abolition. With such a public attitude toward the jury system, it is little wonder that there has been an
almost total lack of reaction to the encroachments of criminal equity.
There is, however, one direction of expansion where the courts
have met vigorous and at least partially successful opposition-the
use of the injunction in labor disputes. The real objection of labor to
the use of the injunction is not the resulting deprivation of the right
to jury trial but rather the fact that if a court postpones a strategically
timed strike by means of an injunction the labor organization may
lose its most potent bargaining weapon; the strike or threatened strike
may be much less effective at some later date when the rights of the
employer to the injunction have been determined on a final hearing.
Despite these objections, the American courts very early determined
78. E.g., a number of cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses have granted injunctive protection to
freedom of speech and religion. Borchert v. City of Ranger, 42 F. Supp. 577 (N. D. Tex. 1941):
Beeler v. Smith, 40 F. Supp. 139 (E. D. Ky. 1941); Reid v. Borough of Brookville, 39 F. Supp. 30
(W. D. Pa. 1941); Kennedy v. City of Moscow, 39 F. Supp. 26 (D. Idaho 1941); Zimmerman v.
Village of London, 38 F. Supp. 582 (S. D. Ohio 1941).
79. Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 30 Cal. 2d 110, 180 P. 2d 321 (1942): Kenyon v. City of
Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 70 N. E. 2d 241 (1946); Harjst v. Hoeger, 349 Mo. 808, 163 S. W. 2d
609 (1942) (property right present but not discussed); Garrett v. Rose, 171 S. W. 2d 893 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1942); see De Funiak, Equitable Protection of Personal or Individual Rights. 36 KY.
L. J. 22, 25 (1947).
80. See, e.g., Teeters, Abolish the Jury System, CVIII FORUM 7 (1947).
81. Teeters, supra note 80, at 12. See also Frank. Trying Criminal Cases without Juries in Maryland,
17 VA. L. REV. 253 (1931), in which the writer points out that between 1924 and 1929 a jury
trial was waived and trial had by court alone in over 90% of the contested criminal cases in
Baltimore.
82. Clark and Shulman, Jury Trial in Civil Cases-a Study in Judicial Administration, 43 YALE L. J.
867 (1934); James. Trial by Jury and the New Rules of Federal Procedure, 45 YALE L. J. 1022.
1026 (1936).
83. Teeters, supra note 80.
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that such use of the injunction was constitutional, finding a property
interest in need of protection, since strikes or threatened strikes usually
involved threatened injury to property of the employer. 4
Having been defeated in the courts, the unions turned to Congress
and state legislatures for assistance. Labor was successful in obtaining a measure of such assistance through the Clayton Act,85 but this
act also somewhat expanded the field of equitable actions, since it
provided authority for private suits to restain violation of the antitrust laws by labor organizations." Judicial interpretation of the
Clayton Act limited its success as an instrument for preventing the
use of injunction, and the result was another campaign by labor
which resulted in the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932,"1 greatly narrowng the equitable power. Labor has been successful in getting
similar statutes enacted in a considerable number of states,8 thus
placing itself in a favored position as compared with the rights of
other citizens.
Abuses of the now unfettered right of labor to strike, particularly
by the United Mine Workers during World War II, led, however,
to a reaction against labor which culminated in the Taft-Hartley
Act."5 This statute somewhat expanded the power to use the labor
injunction." The result was an intensive but unsuccessful campaign in
the 8ist Congress for the repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act and a return to the freedom from injunction granted by the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. 1
As was pointed out previously,92 Great Britain early rejected the
injunction as a method of preventing strikes and, with the exception
of temporary wartime compulsory arbitration legislation, has always
permitted the adjustment of labor disputes on a purely arbitrary
basis, although she has provided an Industrial Court for use in such
adjustments 4f desired by the parties concerned.93 Australia, New
Zealand, and Canada have also avoided the use of injunctions in labor
84. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895):

Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307 (1888); Barr v.

Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 30 Atl. 881 (Ch. 1894); see Bonnett, The Origin of the
Labor Injunction, 5 So. CALIF. L. REV. 105 (1931); Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35
YALE L. J. 825 (1926); see also FRANKFURTER AND GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).

85. 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 28 U. S. C. Sec. 387 (1946).
86. 38 STAT. 737, 15 U. S. C. Sec. 26 (1946); see Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443.

464 (1921).
87. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. Sec. 101 et seq. (1946); see Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunctions
Act, 16 MINN. L. REV. 638 (1932).
88. See Riddlesbarger, State Anti-Injunction Legislation, 14 ORE. L. REv. 501
Labor Injunction Acts, 53 YALE L. J. 553 (1944).

(1985); Note, State

89. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U. S. C. Sees. 141-197 (Supp. No. 1 1948).

90. The act has extended the power of the National Labor Relations Board created by the Wagner
Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. 151 et seq., so that the Board can obtain temporary re-

straining orders or other appropriate relief, at the time it issues a complaint of unfair labor
practices against unions or employers.

91. See Time, July 11, 1949, pp. 15-16.
92. See pp. 5-6 supra.

93. This Industrial Court has handed down more than 2,000 arbitration decisions in cases volunstarily submitted during the past 25 years. Witte, Experience with Strike Legislation Abroad, 243
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY 138-145 (1946).
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disputes, Australia and New Zealand through the establishment of
arbitration courts, with requirements for compulsory arbitration
therein, and Canada through legislation forbidding strikes in certain
industries until full investigation has been made by a Board of Inquiry.94 It is not the purpose of this article to compare the merits or
effectiveness of these various methods of handling the labor-management relations problem, but it is apparent that the civil judiciary stand
much less chance of falling into disrepute with' the laboring classes
of these countries in the British Commonwealth of Nations than they
do in the United States, where the courts are required to issue injunctions in such disputes.
VI. ADVANTAGES INHERENT IN LAW ENFORCEMENT
BY INJUNCTION

One of the most important benefits gained by the use of the injunction as a law enforcement weapon is the granting of relief before
instead of after the event. A crime must have actually been committed before the punitive measures of the criminal law are put into
operation, whereas the very issuance of an injunction will often prevent the commission or at least the repeated commission of the offense. 5
A closely related advantage of injunctive enforcement lies in the
speed with which one who violates the injunction is punished. It is
really the fear of this summary punishment that causes the injunction
to be obeyed and hence to be effective. The forbidden act is already
a crime, and in most cases statutory prohibition and punishment have
already been set by the legislature, often a penalty more severe than
that which the equity court will impose; and yet the threat of this
punishment, since more remote, is not nearly so effective as the more
immediate menace of punitive measures for contempt of an injunction.
It is this threat of summary punishment rather than the penalty itself
which in many instances makes the use of the injunction a much more
effective crime deterrent than the threat of the ordinary criminal
prosecution."
94. Witte, supra note 93. For a criticism of the compulsory arbitration system of New Zealand see
Cohen, Compulsory Arbitration in New. Zealand, 25 PERSONNEL JOURNAL 310 (1947), reprinted in
TIlE REFERENCE SHELF, Vol. 19, No. 6, at 259.
95. Leflar, Equitable Prevention of Public Wrohgs, 14 TEX L. REV. 427, 455 (1936): "Preservation
of public health is better achieved by preventive action than by substituted relief in the form of
punishment after the event. This is obviously true also of the objects sought to be gained by the
enactment of municipal zoning ordinances. Prosecution for their violation might be of negligible effect; unless the violations be actually prevented in all cases the purposes of the laws
would be defeated."
96. See Leflar, supra, note 95, at 460. In addition to the advantages set out in the text above, law
enforcement by injunction may have two other incidental advantazes. In the first place, injunctive enforcement of bad laws forcibly brings such laws to public attention and probably
speeds their repeal. In addition, law enforcement by injunction may also, paradoxically, be beneficial to the criminal himself, since if he chooses to obey the injunctive order he will receive no
punishment from the chancellor for his past misconduct. The wrong-doer can of course still be
punished in a criminal court for this past wrongdoing (see pp. 14-15 infra), but such
punishment is unusual under these circumstances since the state is normally satisfied by obedience to the injunctive order.
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Finally, there may be much less risk of miscarriage of justice in
the equitable proceeding than in a jury trial; this is especially true of
the more complicated business crimes that the average juror does not
understand. 7
VII. DISADVANTAGES INHERENT IN CRIMINAL EQUITY
The principal benefit to be gained from criminal equity thus appears
to lie in speedier law enforcement which in turn furnishes strong discouragement to would-be lawbreakers. This twofold advantage, however, must be weighed against a number of serious disadvantages inherent.in substituting an injunction for a criminal prosecution.
Perhaps the first and most obvious disadvantage is that the proceeding deprives the defendant of the right to a jury trial; and this is
true at two points in the proceedings, since no jury is employed in
determining whether an injunction should be issued in the first instance, nor is one employed in determining whether the defendant
violated the injunction in the event that a contempt proceeding follows.
In addition, if it turns out that the contempt proceeding is for
civil rather than criminal contempt, 8 other important safeguards to
which the defendant would have been entitled at a criminal trial may
be. withheld from him. In cases of criminal contempt by a party, the
purpose of the proceeding is punishment for prior disobedience, and
the defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.9
On the other hand, if'the proceeding be one in civil contempt, for the
purpose of compelling future obedience to the injunctive order, the
violation need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,' 0 some courts
97. See Leflar, supra note 95 at 457, 460.
98. The most important point of distinction between civil and criminal contempt is the purpose of
the sanction applied: "If it is for civil contempt, the punishment is remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt, the sentence is punitive, to vindicate
the authority of the court." Gompers v. Buck Stove and Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 441 (1911).
The form of the proceeding may help to supply the key to its classification as civil or criminal
contempt. If it is brought by the state it will probably be looked on as a proceeding for criminal
contempt, United States ex rel. West Virginia Coal Co. v. Bittner, 11 F. 2d 93 (C.C.A. 4th
1926), although this factor is not controlling, and the state may institute proceedings for civil
contempt, United Stittes v. United Mine Workers, 830 U. S. 258 (1947). The purpose of the
proceeding as revealed in the prayer for relief is perhaps a better key. If the prayer is for
"punishment" of defendant, the proceeding may be classified as criminal contempt, whereas a
prayer that defendant be "coerced" into complying with the injunction is indicative of a civil
contempt proceedings. McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 80 F. 2d 211 (C.C.A. 2nd 1935).
A key to how the trial court views the proceeding is the contempt judgment. If a fine is
ordered paid to the state, or the defendant is sentenced to imprisonment for a fixed term, the
trial court is treating the proceeding as one for criminal contempt, Stewart v. United States,
235 Fed. 838 (C.C.A. 8th 1916), whereas an order to pay a sum to a private plaintiff, or imprisonment for an indefinite term, pending compliance with the injunction, indicates that the
court is treating the proceeding as one for civil contempt. Campbell v. Motion Picture Machine
Operators, 151 Minn. 238, 186 N. W. 787 (1922).
Unfortunately the Supreme Court in the recent case of United States v. United Mine Workers,
330 U. S. 258 (1947) added to the confusion by holding that criminal and civil contempt proceedings could be tried together, but it would seem that in such a case the defendant is entitled to the safeguards surrounding the criminal proceeding.
See further Moskovitz. Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 COL. L. REv. 780 (1943);
23 IND. L. T. 114 (1948).
99. Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 408 (1911); Parker v. United States, 153 F. 2d
66 (C.C.A. 1st 1946); Root v. McDonald, 260 Mass. 344. 157 N. E. 684 (1927).
100. Coca-Cola Co. v. Feulner, 7 F. Supp. 864 (S. D. Tex. 1934); State v. Frolick, 316 Ill. 77,
146 N. E. 733 (1935).
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requiring only a preponderance of the evidence... while others have
required that the proof be "clear and convincing.""..2 Moreover, the
privilege against self-incrimination cannot be invoked in civil contempt proceedings," 3 while in criminal contempt proceedings the defendant cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself."' Finally, the Supreme Court has recently decided that civil contempt proceedings will lie even though the violation is innocent and not "willful.,'105
The possible loss of these rights becomes particularly important
because the Supreme Court in 1939 in the case of McCrone v. United
States'" upheld the power of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, an administrative agency, to proceed for civil contempt, thus depriving
the defendant of these additional rights. The earlier contempt cases
initiated by the government that involved indictable crimes, such as
proceedings instituted for violation of labor injunctions" 7 and of injunctions used to enforce liquor laws,"' were almost invariably handled
as criminal contempt proceedings. Today, however, following the
authorization of the McCrone case, there is an increasing tendency
on the part of the federal agencies to resort to civil contempt proceedings,1"' in some cases for the apparent purpose of avoiding the
additional requirements of proof necessary in a criminal proceeding;"'
and this choice of civil proceedings has been upheld even when the
agency itself was not injured and hence not in a position to benefit
from coercive relief."'
The possibility of double punishment, once in a contempt proceeding for violation of the injunction and once through criminal prosecu101. State v. Frolick, 316 Ill. 77, 146 N. E. 733 (1935).
102. Coca-Cola Co. v. Feulner, 7 F. Supp. 364 (S. D. Tex. 1934); Morgan v. National Bank of
Commerce, 90 Okla. 280, 217 Pac. 388 (1923).
103. American Pastry Products Corp. v. United Products Corp.. 39 F. 2d 181 (D. Mass. 1930); see
Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 447-448 (1911).
104. Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911); Parker v. United States, 153 F.
2d 66 (C.C.A. 1st 1946); State ex rel. Dailey v. Dailey, 164 Wash. 140, 2 P. 2d 79 (1931).
Contra: Merchants' Stock & Grain Co. v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 201 Fed. 20 (C.C.A. 8th
1912); State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 132 Neb. 166, 271 N. W. 282 (1937)
(not a violation of
an injunction).
105. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 69 S. Ct. 497 (1949).
106. 307 U. S. 61 (1939) (not an *nJunJ..n -a .,.
107. Gompers v. United States. 233 U. S. 604 (1914); In re United Hatters of North America, 110
N. J. Eq. 42, 158 Atl. 435 (1932). A long list of such cases may be found in Moscovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 COL. L. REV. 780, 798 n. 86 (1943).
108. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87 (1925); State ex rel. Jones v. Miller, 147 Kan. 242, 75 P. 2d
239 (1938). For other cases see Moscovitz, supra note 107, at 799, n. 88.
109. Parker v. United States, 135 F. 2d 54 (1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 737 (1943), intervening
bankruptcy proceedings held not to purge of civil contempt, 153 F. 2d 66 (1946) (proceedings
initiated by Federal Marketing Administrator); Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U. S. 585 (1947) (proceedings initiated by Securities and Exchange Comm'n); Taylor v. Bowles, 152 F. 2d 311
(C.C.A. 9th 1945). cert. denied, 327 U. S. 806 (1946) (initiated by OPA).
110. Note, The Statutory Injunction as an Enforcement Weapon of Federal Agencies, 57 YALE L. J.
1023, 1042 (1948). The author cites figures supplied by the Dept. of Labor showing that be.
tween Oct. 1938 and July 1946 the Wage and Hour Division of that department instituted 49
civil and 133 criminal contempt proceedings.
111. Fleming v. Warshawsky & Co., 123 F. 2d 622 (C.C.A. 7th 1941) (proceeding to enforce payment of back wages, although employees had waived payment). Contra: Walling v. Crane, 158
F. 2d 80 (C.C.A. 5th 1946).
,.44
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tion for the commission of a crime, is a disturbing factor. The mere
fact that the violation complained of is a crime because it is a violation of a law does not prevent it from also being considered as a
violation of a decree and also punishable as such; and punishment
under one aspect is not looked upon as constituting former jeopardy
when punishment is sought under the other aspect." 2
A further danger inherent in the use of the injunction as a criminal
enforcement weapon results from the summary nature of preliminary
injunction proceedings. The possibility of obtaining an ex parte
order" ' purely for purposes of delay has been the subject of considerable criticism in labor cases.. and has resulted in restriction of the
use of the injunction in the labor field.
If we add to the summary nature of the proceedings the fact that
statutes in many jurisdictions allow private parties to institute equitable proceedings in the name of the state," 5 and the further fact that
such parties may often be irresponsible or actuated by improper
motives,"' we can see that a real danger exists in this area.
Another disadvantage inherent in all contempt proceedings, and
consequently applicable to the use of such proceedings in enforcing
the criminal law, is the fact that the judge, being human, may take
it as a personal affront when his order is disobeyed; and hence there
is at least a possibility that he may be somewhat prejudiced against
the person who has presumed to disobey his order." 7
112. Murphy v. United States. 272 U. S. 630 (1926)
(acquittal in criminal prosecution for maintenance of a public nuisance held not to bar a bill for an injunction based on the same facts);
Pompano Horse Club v. State, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801 (1927); State v. Roby, 142 Ind. 168,
41 N. E. 145 (1895); State v. Threlkeld, 207 Iowa 636, 223 N. W. 363 (1929); Ex parte Allison,
99 Tex. 455, 90 S. W. 870 (1906); See Note, 2 U. OF FLA. L. REV. 250 (1949). A federal statute
specifically provides that a proceeding for criminal contempt in a federal court shall not be a
bar to a criminal prosecution for the same act. 62 STAT. 862 (1948), (New Title 18 U. S. C. Sec.
3285, 1948 U. S. CODE CONG. SERV., Vol. 1, App. 2). The defense of former jeopardy, however,
has been held to bar an attempt by a chancellor to punish twice for the same criminal contempt. In re Bradley, 318 U. S. 50 (1943). As to the practical probability of double punishment see note 96 supra.
113. "...
injunctive writs are of three general classes: first, the temporary restraining order or injunction ad interim, which in the ordinary course issues ex parte, without notice or hearing;
second, the temporary injunction or injunction pendente lite, issuing after notice and opportunity to be heard; third, the permanent injunction, based on a full hearing and enforcing the
final decision or writ . . ." FRANKFURTER AND GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 53 (1930).
114. "Sweeping injunctions, often of doubtful interpretation, are issued, . . . It becomes a mockery
to say to him (the unionist) that upon appeal, if error has been committed, his rights will be
restored to him. They may not be, and if they are, the opportunity for their effective exercise
has so far passed that the correction made by the appellate court is of no possible value."
Ralston, Government by Injunction, 5 CORN. L. Q. 424, 425 (1920).
115. Supra page 7: see note 58 8up a.
116. "A closely related basis of difficulty is the institution of equity proceedings by irresponsible
private parties. It is sometimes true that the institution of a prosecution for crime is almost
as serious in its effect upon the business and social standing of a defendant in the community
as would be an actual conviction. One of the traditional functions of the grand jury is to sift out
unfounded charges and prevent injuries which accrue from formal prosecutions based upon
them. Insofar as private persons who may be actuated by malice or economic self-interest are
permitted to institute proceedings alleging the commission of crime and threatening punishment therefor, that beneficially protective function of the grand jury is lost. Probably a majority of the labor injunction cases are of that sort, and there are statutes in many states
which permit private initiation of suits to enjoin enumerated activities classified as public
nuisances." Leflar, Equitable Prevention of Public Wrongs, 14 TEx. L. REV. 427, 436-437 (1936).
117. See Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402,
423 (1918). In criticizing the use of summary proceedings in an indirect contempt case not
involving disobedience of a court order or decree (the contempt consisted of newspaper criticism of a suit pending before the court) Justice Holmes points out the danger of personal
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The most serious single objection to the expansion of equity into
the criminal field, however, seems to be that such a procedure violates fundamental distinctions between criminal and civil courts inherent in our system of jurisprudence, distinctions established for the
better protection of the individual accused of crime. This should
be a matter of considerable concern to those whobelieve that the
criminal law is or at least should be founded on natural law.
Assuming as correct the position of the architects of natural law
philosophy, including Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas, that immorality is the essence of criminal behavior,"' moral fault should be
the basis for punishment for crime."' Starting with Hobbes, 2 ' however, the theory of the nature of crime and of punishment has undergone radical change. Following in Ilobbes' foosteps, Hume took
the position that a legal system, to be socially useful, must adhere
strictly to its rules even at the expense of injustice in individual cases."
This line of thought, coming down to us through Bentham and Austin,' has had a profound influence on some of our most brilliant
American jurists. Thus Holmes tells us that the law "is continually
transmuting those moral standards into external or objective ones
from which the actual guilt of the party concerned is wholly eliminated."' 2 ' Again, he states that the law "is wholly indifferent to the internal phenomena of conscience."''
But, although this positivistic attitude may permeate the criminal
judiciary, it remains true that most juries will not convict unless convinced of the moral guilt of the criminal wrongdoer, 5 a fact that is
one of the strongest arguments for the retention of the jury system in
criminal cases."' Thus, if a Holmes on the bench should feel that

118.

119.
120,
121.
122.
123,
124.
125.
126.

prejudice in such cases: "When it is considered how contrary it is to our practice and ways of
thinking for the same person to be accuser and sole judge in a matter which, if he be sensitive,
may involve strong personal feeling, I should expect the power to be limited by the necessities
of the case 'to insure order and decorum in their presence' . . . I would go as far as any man
in favor of the sharpest and most summary enforcement of order in Court and obedience to
decrees but when there is no need of immediate action contempts are like any other breach of
law and should be dealt with as the law deals with other illegal acts."
ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, bk. V, c. 1, 1129a: "We see then that all men mean by the term Justice a
moral state such that in consequence of it men have the capacity of doing what is just, and
actually do it, and wish it: similarly also with respect to Injustice, a moral state such that in
consequence of it men do unjustly and wish what is unjust." Id. at c. 10, 1137a: ". . . it is not
the mere doing these things which constitutes acts of cowardice or injustice (except accidentally), but the doing them with certain inward dispositions." See AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA
1I-I, Q. 21, Art. 2.
"Man is master of his actions, and yet, insofar as he belongs to another, i.e., the community,
of which he forms part, he merits or demerits inasmuch as he disposes his acts well or ill;
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-I, Q. 21, Art. 3.
Hobbes himself considered criminal acts to be morally wrong. "A crime is a sin." LEVIATHAN
151. But, by removing the natural law basis from the positive law, he laid the foundation for
modern legal positivism. CAIRNS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL 271 (1949).
CAIRNS, op. cit. supra note 120, at 369.
Id. at 549.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 38 (1881).
Id. at 110.
Leflar, Equitable Prevention of Public Wrongs, 14 TEX. L. REV. 427, 460 (1936).
"It is because of, not in spite of, the kind of standards for judgment which jurors use that I
believe the jury system works, and works well. Juries are a cross-section of the population, the
community in microcosm, and they therefore reflect the mores. If the jury system is a failure,
so is democracy." Stern, Common Sense and the Law, THE AMERICAN MERCURY, Feb. 1949, pp.
145-52.
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there was no need for any justification of punishment other than
utility, his jury might still add the moral element that he rejected;
whereas if the same offense should be judged in a civil court when it
was the basis for a petition for an injunction, the moral judgment
provided by the jury might be absent.
The early chancellors based their decisions on the natural law."
Today, however, even though equity exercises some discretion in
granting or refusing relief, utilitarian concepts are likely to prevail;
and the merger of law and equity in most American jurisdictions,
with the resulting abolition of chancellors trained to think along
equitable lines, may tend to increase the utilitarianism of a court
which, in considering whether an injunction should be issued, is seeking primarily to prevent a tort rather than a crime.129 The point
might well also be raised that the utilitarianism of our lawmakers
evidenced in some of our modern criminal laws provides an additional
reason for the safeguard of the moral judgment injected by the jury
when it comes to punishment for their breach; and it seems arguable
that the enlightened conscience which provides the basis for this
moral judgment is more likely to be found in a lay jury than in a
judge fettered by training as a legal "realist."' 30
Moreover, the criminal law is better equipped to take into consideration the peculiarities of individual criminals when punishing
for an offense, for it makes provisions for such individual differences
through the use of the suspended sentence, minimum-maximum penalties, provisions for parole, etc., provisions which will probably not
be given much consideration by an equity judge punishing for disobedience of an injunctive order.
Finally, it is submitted that excessive use of the injunction as a
criminal enforcement mechanism may bring our civil courts into disrepute among important elements of our society. This is already
evident in the labor cases, in which the frequent issuing of injunctions
against labor has resulted in a cynical attitude on its part toward what
it regards as a class-conscious judiciary."'
127. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 50 (1881): ". . . the tests of liability are external, and indelpendent
of the degree of evil in the particular person's motives or intentions."
128. Thus one early chancellor (Chancellor Stillington) says that his court exercises jurisdiction "according to the law of nature, which is called by some the law merchant (but) which is universal
law for all the world," Anonymous, Y. B. 13 EDW. I, Pasc., fol. 9, pl. 5 (1473), 46 SELDEN
SOCIETY, SELECT CASES ON THE LAW MERCHANT, App. II to Introduction, LXXXV, LXXXVI
(1929).
129. The expansion of strict liability in the tort field today, based not on "fault" but rather the
"utility" of shifting the risk of pecuniary loss to that segment of society most fitted to bear it,
is evidenced by such legislation as Workman's Compensation Acts. The philosophy behind such
lavs is bound to have an effect on that segment of the judiciary dealing with tort liability.
130. If it is argued that in some cases the decision of the jury is based on prejudice rather than
evidence, one writer answers with considerable logic: "The prejudices of one or more judges are
worse than the prejudices of twelve men whose differing opinions are modified by those of their
fellows." Hall, The Present Day Jury: A Defense, 10 A. B. A. J. 111 (1924).
131. See, e.g.. the attitude of the longshoremen evidenced in Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d
464, 04 P. 2d 983 (1939), cert. granted, 309 U. S. 649 (1940). reversed, 314 U. S. 252 (1941).
In connection with the coal strike of 1946, the CIO national convention resolved: "American
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VIII. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

The practice of law enforcement by injunction is so well established
today that any recommendation for its abolition would be mere wishful thinking. Moreover, its benefits in some fields outweight its disadvantages, as will be pointed out in Part IX infra. Certain improvements might be suggested, however, which would go far to ameliorate
the disadvantages mentioned in Part VII supra.
In the first place, the danger of personal prejudice on the part of
the judge sentencing for contempt of an injunction which he has
issued might be eliminated by requiring that such contempt be punished only by a judge other than the one who issued the injunction."1
The disadvantages arising from issuance of ex parte injunctive
orders prior to a hearing might be overcome by requiring a hearing
on the merits prior to the issuance of such orders. 3 The delay that
would necessarily result from requiring such a hearing, however,
might in many instances be sufficient to make the issuance of any order
useless when the hearing was held.3 Perhaps a better solution would
be legislation shortening the effective period of such orders and requiring that the courts be made immediately available for a preliminary hearing on the merits before the issuance of a temporary injunction designed to supersede the ex parte order at the end of such
brief period. Legislation of this type would prevent the abuse of
ex parte orders and still provide for the immediate preservation of
the status quo in those situations in which immediate action is necessary. Such is the present status of federal labor law. The abuse of
ex parte orders in the labor field led to the abolition of the use of
such orders by the Norris-LaGuardia Act.'35 Sixteen years of experience, however, led Congress to restore the temporary restraining
order, but with a five-day maximum limitation and provisions for
notice and an opportunity for the adverse party to appear and present
relevant testimony. 130
democracy cannot tolerate any attempt to impose economic slavery through vicious anti-labor

injunctions," N. Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1946, p. 1, col. 5. For a similar statement by President
William F. Greene, speaking for the A. F. of L., see N. Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1946, p. 24, col. 2.
132. See note, 21 DIcK. L. REv. 226 (1917). Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides such protection in cases of criminal contempt when "the contempt charged involves
disrespect to or criticism of a judge." It is suggested that this protection be extended to cover

all proceedings for contempt of injunctive orders.
133. See Leflar, Equitable Prevention of Public Wrongs, 14 TEX. L. REV. 427, 436 (1936).
134. E.g., a situation like that presented in Binnicker v. Leeper, 138 Fla. 738, 190 So. 6 (1939). Defendant was threatening to cut down a number of ornamental shade trees preparatory to

opening a thoroughfare over land the title to which was claimed by plaintiff. Even a short delay
might result in the trees being cut, after which the temporary restraining order would be of

no value.
135. 47 STAT. 70, c. 90 (1932),

29 U. S. C. See. 101 et seq. Sec. 107 (1946)

sets down such rigid

requirements as to make it a practical impossibility to obtain such an order.
136. The Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U. S. C. Secs. 141-197 (Supp. No.

1, 1948).

See.

151 provides for temporary restraining orders against certain designated unfair labor practices
"notwithstanding any other provision of law: Provided further that no temporary restraining

order shall be issued without notice unless a petition alleges that substantial and irreparable
injury to the charging party will be unavoidable and such temporary restraining order shall be
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Obviously nothing more than the preservation of the status quo
should be permitted on ex parte orders, and a legislative attempt in
one jurisdiction to permit summary abatement of gambling establishments by ex parte proceeding prior to a hearing on the merits has
been rightly held unconstitutional.137
The further extension of equity into the field of enforcing the
criminal law might be checked and perhaps even reversed by revising
our criminal procedure so as to insure a more equal and more expeditious enforcement of the criminal law. 3 ' In this connection the jury
receives much unjustified blame for miscarriage of criminal justice;
it is really a minor offender compared to the courts themselves.139
Nevertheless, improving the quality of our juries would be a step in
the right direction.' It is submitted that raising the standards of
criminal law enforcement through these two means would be much
more effective as a crime deterrent than would the increasing of criminal penalties suggested in a recent comment."
As to deprivation of a jury trial, as has been pointed out previously,
the equity defendant is really deprived of such a trial at two points:
first, on the question as to whether facts have been proven that
justify the issuance of an injunction; and, second, in the contempt pro.
ceedings, if any, on the question as to whether the facts constitute a
violation of the injunctive order.
The deprivation of a jury trial at the first stage might possibly
be remedied by legislation giving the defendant the right to elect to
have a jury pass on disputable questions of fact prior to enjoining
permanently an act that is also a crime.' The propriety of issuing an
injunction has never been considered a jury question, however; and, if
there has actually been a hearing on the facts giving rise to the issuance of an injunction, the complaint usually does not come as to the
fairness of this hearing but rather as to the fairness of the contempt

137.
138.
139.

140.

141.
142.

effective for no longer than five days and will become void at the expiration of such period.
Upon the filing of any such petition the courts shall cause notice thereof to be served upon any
person involved in the charge and such person, including the charging party, shall be given an
opportunity to appear by counsel and present any relevant testimony."
Mongogna v. O'Dwyer, 204 La. 1030, 16 So. 2d 829 (1943); see 6 LA. L. REv. 286 (1945).
The new Federal Criminal Code, 62 STAT. 862, c. 645, Sec. 21 (1948), 1948 U. S. CODE CONG. SERV.
Vol. 1, App. 2, pp. A 323 et seq. (Complete revision of Title 18 U. S. C.), is a step in this direction.
Henry Clay Caldwell, former presiding judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, makes the following statement in Trial by Judge and Jury, 17 AMERICAN
FEDERATIONIST 385 (1910) : "It is sometimes asserted that the juries are responsible for the
miscarriage of justice which occasionally takes place in criminal cases, As a rule the responsibility for such miscarriage will be found on the bench and not in the jury box. Observation
teaches us, and the law reports prove, that ten guilty men escape through the errors and mistakes and technical quibbles of the courts for one who escapes through an error of the jury."
See Knox, Twelve Good Men and True, N. Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1943, Sec. 6, p. 16, containing
recommendations of Mr. Justice Knox of the U. S. District Court for improvement in the
selection of federal juries. See also For Better Juries, Business Week, Dec. 23. 1944, p. 16. The
American attitude toward jury duty as a task to be shunned should be compared with the
English attitude of respect, which leads to better qualified juries and a much better appreciation of the virtues of the jury system. See notes 177, 179 infra.
Comment, 32 VA. L. RvV. 677 (1946).
See Comment, 8 CORN. L. Q. 371 (1923). Georgia has a statutory provision for special jury
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conviction without a jury trial.' Hence it is submitted that the main
objection could be overcome by requiring a jury trial at the second
stage, before punishment for contempt of an injunction, at least in
all cases in which that contempt also constitutes a crime, and perhaps
in all instances in which criminal contempt is alleged.
a type of indirect contempt, "
Contempt of an injunctive order is.
but it is a contempt of the court; and our American courts hold that,
in the absence of statutes prohibiting them from doing so, they have
an inherent power to punish for such contempt without a jury trial.'45
This doctrine of inherent power to punish summarily for indirect
contempt can be traced to a statement in Blackstone's Commentaries
to the effect that the right to punish summarily in such cases had existed in England from time immemorial.' Later research by Sir John
Fox indicates that Blackstone was partially in error. Disobedience of
court orders or decrees by litigants was looked upon purely as civil
contempt, and as such was punishable summarily. 4 ' Other types of
indirect contempt, as, for example, fraud or disobedience by an officer
out of the presence of the court, or publication of libels on the court,
were treated as criminal contempt, and such cases were prosecuted
in jury proceedings until the Court of Star Chamber inaugurated the
practice of summary punishment for criminal contempt, after which
these cases were transferred to that court for prosecution until its
abolition in 1640."' It was only after the dissolution of the Court of
Star Chamber that the common law and chancery courts usurped the
power of summary punishment for criminal contempt."' Today disobedience of court orders, even when treated as criminal contempt, is
punished summarily by our American courts; but the fact that sumverdicts of the facts only at the election of either party in all proceedings for equitable relief.
CA. CODE Sec. 37-1104 (1933).
143. A related danger, so far as the issuance of the injunction itself is concerned, is the use of
injunctive orders so broad as to cover much more than the act complained of. That the courts
themselves are aware of this danger is apparent from the recent case of N. L. R. B. v. Stowe
Spinning Co., 69 S. Ct. 541, 544 (1949). In remanding the cause for issuance of a more
limited order, the Court said: "But violation of the order brings the swift retribution of contempt, without the normal safeguards of a full-dress proceeding . . . We must require explicit
language making it clear that the mere denial of facilities will not subject respondents to
punishment for contempt." Nevertheless, federal agencies have been successful in some instances in obtaining injunctions ordering obedience to an entire complicated statute, as in
Bowles v. Montgomery Ward, 143 F. 2d 38 (C.C.A. 7th 1944). But cf. Fleming v. Jacksonville
Paper Co., 128 F. 2d 395 (C.C.A. 5th 1942), aff'd, 317 U. S. 564 (1943). in which such a
statute-wide injunction was ordered modified.
144. Indirect contempt, as distinguished from direct contempt, is contempt not committed "in the
presence of courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice." 4 STAT. 487
(1831). 28 U. S. C. Sec. 385 (1946); see Charles Cushman Co. v. Machesy, 135 Me. 490, 494, 200
At. 505, 508 (1938).
145. "It has always been one of the attributes-one of the powers necessarily incident to a court of
Justice--that it should have this power of vindicating its dignity, of enforcing its orders,
of protecting itself from insult, without the necessity of calling upon a jury to assist it in the
exercise of this power." Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth County, 134 U. S. 31, 36
(1890). Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 464, 94 P. 2d 983 (1939), cert. granted, 309 U. S.
649 (1940), rcv'd on other grounds, 314 U. S. 252 (1941); Safie Mfg. Co. v. Arnold, 228 N. C.
375, 45 S. E. 2d 577 (1947).
146. 4 PL. COMM. *283-*285.
147. Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 1. 3, 104 (1927).
148. Id., at 116-117, and appendix, 227 et seq.
149. Id., at 116-117. See Frankfurter and Landis. Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal
Contestts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARe. L. Rsv.
1010, 1042-1047 (1924).
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mary punishment for criminal contempt had become the practice in
England by the time the United States Constitution was adopted precludes any claim that such procedure is unconstitutional. It does not,
however, preclude the possibility of establishing the right to a jury
trial in such cases by legislative action.5 0
Organized labor succeeded in getting Congress to pass such an
enactment in 1914 as a part of the Clayton Act, 5' for the purpose of
preventing punishment for violation of labor injunctions by summary
contempt procedure. This part of the act provided for a jury trial on
demand of the defendant in cases of criminal contempt not committed
in the presence of the court if the act complained of was also a statutory crime. Although enqcted at the behest of labor, this provision
applied to all criminal contempt proceedings brought in federal courts
for the punishment of acts which were also crimes, and not merely to
contempts resulting from violation of labor injunctions.' 3 This section
of the Clayton Act was held constitutional,'53 but unfortunately the
opinion approved the "inherent power" theory advocated by Blackstone,"4 basing the constitutionality of the statute on the power of
Congress to regulate the lower federal courts, since these courts were
created by Congress rather than by the Constitution. The decision,
therefore, is not a useful precedent in the case of constitutionally
created courts, and most of our state courts are so created.
When several state legislatures passed enactments similar to these
provisions of the Clayton Act, the courts of those states reacted by
holding such legislation unconstitutional on the ground that a legislature could not so shackle a constitutionally created court.'55 On the
other hand, in the case of two other constitutionally created courts,
those of New York and Pennsylvania, statutes providing for trial
by jury in all indirect contempt cases based on violation of labor injunctions have been held constitutional." 6 In each of these cases the
150. Such a suggestion is found in Beale, Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 HARY. L. Rzv.
161. 174 (1908).
151. 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 28 U. S. C. Sec. 387 (1946).
152. Ibid. This provision of the Clayton Act was repealed in 1948, 62 STAT. 862, c. 645, Sec. 21 (1948),

18 U. S. C. A. See. 387 (Supp. 1948) when substantially the same provisions for jury trial were
transferred to the new federal criminal code, 62 STAT. 862, c. 645, See. 1 (1948), 1948 U. S.
CODE CONG. SERV., Vol. 1, App. 2 (New Title 18 U. S. C. Sec. 3691).

153. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S. 42 (1924).
154. "That the power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts, has been many times settled
and may be regarded as settled law . . . So far as the inferior Federal courts are concerned,
however, it is not beyond the authority of Congress . . . " Id. at 65.
155. Walton Lunch Co. v. Kearney, 236 Mass. 210, 128 N. E. 429 (1920); Fort v. Cooperative Farmers' Exchange, 81 Colo. 431, 256 Pac. 319 (1927)
(using the distinction suggested in the
Michaelson case, supra note 154). Wisconsin has a similar statute, Wis. STAT. Sec. 103.60(3)
(1947), the constitutionality of which has not yet been directly passed upon by the Court. In
John F. Jelke Co. v. Hill, 208 Wis. 650, 242 N. W. 576, 580 (1932), however, the Wisconsin
Court indicated that its constitutionality was questionable because the court was constitutionally created.

156. Kronowitz v. Schlansky, 156 Misc. 717, 282 N. Y. Supp. 564 (1935): Pennsylvania Anthracite
Mining Co. v. Anthracite Miners of Pennsylvania, 318 Pa. 401, 178 Ati. 291 (1935). The NorrisLaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 72 (1932). 29 U. S. C. Sec. 111 (1946). had similarly extended the
limitation of Dower of the federal courts to punish for contempt of labor injunctions without
jury trial beyond situations in which the violation was also a crime to all violations of labor

injunctions. This provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was repealed In 1948, 62 STAT. 862,
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state constitution contained broad provisions for legislative altera-

tion of the powers of these courts, and the court was willing to
accept such limitation on its power.
At least two states, Arkansas and Georgia, have attempted to
control the power of their courts to punish for contempt by passing
constitutional amendments empowering the state legislature to regu-

late the power of the courts to punish for contempt.'

However, the

Arkansas court has succeeded in limiting the effect of this constitutional amendment to some extent by extending the "constructive pres-

ence of the court" in some cases to the place where the contempt was
committed. "8 In Georgia the constitutional provision was nullified by
a strained interpretation to the effect that the constitutional amendment empowered the legislature to prescribe only the punishment after
conviction for contempt, not the method of trial for the contempt.'M'
One other state, Oklahoma, by constitutional provision has guaranteed
to all the right to a jury trial in all indirect contempt cases."' This
guarantee is backed up by
appropriate legislation"' and is respected
1
by the Oklahoma Court. 62
It is submitted that statutes similar to the Clayton Act as presently
reenacted in the new federal criminal code,' ; but providing for trial by
jury at the option of the defendant in all contempt cases in which the
act complained of is also a crime, rather than merely in those cases
in which the proceeding is one for criminal contempt, might provide
a sufficiently adequate safeguard for the rights of the accused while
allowing the retention of the most useful feature of law enforcement by injunction, the possibility of preventing crimes in advance of
their occurrence through the injunction itself. "' Statutes drawn to

157.

158.
159.
160.

161.
162.

163.
164.

c. 645, Sec. 21 (1948), 29 U. S. C. A. Sec. 111 (Supp. 1948), when substantially the same provision for jury trial for contempt in all labor dispute cases was transferred to the new federal
criminal code, 62 STAT. 862, c. 645, Sec. 21 (1948), 1948 U. S. CODE CONe,. SEEV. Vol. 1, App. 2
(New Title 18 U. S. C. Sec. 3692). The constitutionality of this extension of the right to a
jury trial beyond contempts that are also crimes has not been directly ruled on by the federal
courts.
AlK. CONST. Art. VII, Sec. 26 (1874): "The General Assembly shall have power to regulate by
law the punishment of contempts not committed in the presence or hearing of the courts, or
in disobedience to process." GA. CONST. Art. I. Sec. 1, Par. XX (1945): "The power of the
Courts to punish for contempt shall be limited by legislative acts."
Weldon v. State, 150 Ark. 407, 234 S. W. 466 (1921); Turk v. State, 123 Ark. 341, 185 S. W.
472 (1916) (neither case involving disobedience of an injunctive order).
Cobb v. State, 187 Ga. 448, 200 S. E. 796 (1939); Bradley v. State, 111 Ga. 168, 36 S. E. 630
(1900).
OKLA. CONST. Art. II, Sec. 25 (1907): "The legislature shall pass laws defining contempts and
regulating the proceedings and punishment in matters of contempt: Provided, that any persons accused of violating or disobeying when not in the presence or hearing of the court or
judge sitting as such, any order of injunction, or restraint, made or entered by any court or
judge of the State, shall, before penalty or punishment is imposed, be entitled to a trial by
jury as to the guilt or innocence of the accused .
OKLA. STAT., Tit. 21, Sec. 567 (1941).
Ex parte Mitchell, 189 Okla. 51, 113 P. 2d 979 (1941): Blanchard v. Bryan, 83 Okla. 33, 200 Pac.
444 (1921). But cf. Vogel v. Corporation Comm'n of Okla., 190 Okla. 156, 121 P. 2d 586 (1942).
holding defendant not entitled to a jury trial in a contempt proceeding before the Corporation
Commission on the ground that the Commission was not a court within the meaning of the
constitutional and statutory provisions.
62 STAT. 862. c. 645, Sec. 1 (1948), 1948 U. S. CODE CONG. SERV., Vol. 1, App. 2 (New Title
18 U. S. C. Sec. 3691). See note 152 surn.
See Fleming v. Phipps, 55 F. Supp. 627 (D. Md. 1940), in which an agency urged issuance of
an injunction not only to deter defendant from further violation but also to discourage others
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cover all contempt cases in which the act is also a crime would have
an added advantage over statutes such as the Clayton Act providing
for jury trial for criminal contempts, inasmuch as a jury trial may
still be evaded under such a statute by resorting to civil contempt
proceedings." 5
Such a provision for a jury trial in these cases would, of course, reduce somewhat the speed with which equity acts, and this fact is a
disadvantage; but it is submitted that this disadvantage would be
outweighed by the additional protection,granted to the accused. This
protection could be attained without pro"iding for a jury trial in
cases other than those in which the act is also a crime; and it is
believed that such legislation would stand far more ch ance of being
held constitutional if the limitations on the power of courts to punish
for contempt were not broadened to include a jury trial in all indirect
contempt cases, as is provided for in Oklahoma. 6
If, in addition, such legislation were to provide that either a contempt proceeding or a criminal prosecution would constitute former
jeopardy in a subsequent proceeding in the other of these two forms,
the double jeopardy objection..7 would be effectively removed.
IX. CONCLUSION
Will equity continue to expand into the field of the criminal law?
Although it is obviously impossible to transfer the prosecution of
every crime today from a jury to an equity judge by the simple expedient of calling it a nuisance, there is no indication of any serious
move to check the expansion of criminal equity.. 8 except in the labor
through the example that would be made of defendant. The fear of injury to his reputation from

a widely public:zed injunction may make even the threat of a government agency to seek such
an injunction ef~ective as a crime deterrent, especially in cases involving business men who can.
not afford adverse publicity.

165. In United '-ne Workers v. United States, 330 U. S. 258 (1947), the use of civil contempt proceedin', o, the Attorney General of the United States was upheld. The case actually involved
both vii and criminal contempt, but apparently the Attorney General could have proceeded
en' ,.ely by way of civil contempt if he thought such procedure desirable. The actual purpose
of proceeding in civil contempt in this case was not to evade a jury trial, since the strike in

qu-stion did not come under the provisions of the Clayton Act.
166. There are some who object to the extension of jury trials because a jury trial sometimes allows
s guilty party to go free as a result of the requirement of a unanimous verdict. Such an objection might be met by a constitutional amendment providing that the concurrence of fivesixths of a jury and no more shall be necessary for a verdict. See A PROPOSED CONSTITUTION PO
FLORIDA Art. V, Sec. 18. The Code of Criminal Procedure of the American Law Institute provides for the abrogation of the unanimous verdict except when the offense is punishable by
death, A. L. I. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Sec. 355 (1931). See also Miner, The Jury Problem, 41 ILL. L. REv. 183, 186 (1946): "The abandonment of unanimity, however, would materially lessen the opportunity for the defense successfully to inflict upon the community the
wrongs as it is now able to do through its ability by devious methods to m:slead or confuse a
single juror." Unanimity is not required for conviction by courts-martial, except in cases involving death penalties; geeArticle of War 43, 41 STAT. 795 (1920). as amended by 62 STAT. 633
(1948), 10 U. S. C. A. Sec. 1514 (Supp. 1948). Military justice has been the subject of much
recent criticism, but none of this criticism seems to have been directed at this provision for
conviction by less than a unanimous verdict.

167. See pp. 5-6 supra.
168. The most recent direction of expansion seems to be in the field of protection of civil liberties.
See p. 9 supra.
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field.169 Labor's real reason for seeking to prevent injunctive law enforcement is not primarily to protect the individual working man from
improperly administered criminal punishment but rather to remove
the possibility of speedy judicial intervention lessening the bargaining power of a striking union.
The extension of the injunctive field as regards other citizens has
progressed so far today that any suggestion that the use of the injunction as a law enforcement weapon be abandoned 7. must be classified as mere wishful thinking. Until the public becomes aware of the
dangers involved, it is unlikely that such expansion will be checked;
and probably very little aid can be expected from members of the
judiciary, many of whom are by nature suspicious of the ability of
jurors and reluctant to relinquish any of their powers."
In some fields, such as the protection of public health, the advantages of speed probably outweigh the risk involved. Also, the injunction is probably the only really effective means of controlling some of
our large and necessarily impersonal corporations. In these cases individual punishment of the officers, even via equity, is quite unusual;
hence it is unlikely that many individuals are being deprived of the
right to a jury trial by equitable intervention. This observation may
be equally applicable to the problem of controlling our larger labor
unions; individual prosecutions of members are becoming quite as
unusual as prosecutions of corporate officers. The merits of these
trends are outside this discussion.
Even if we agree, however, that there are fields in which the enforcement of laws by injunction may be extremely beneficial, the mere
fact that this use of the injunction is constitutional does not mean that
we should countenance the expansion of its use into areas in which
the results cannot be justified in the light of the disadvantages involved; and the unlimited use of the injunction by our mushrooming
federal administrative agencies as a substitute for criminal prosecution may well be one of these areas. Moreover, such use of the injunction may have a tendency to bring our courts into disrepute with
a considerable element of the population, as the use of the labor injunction has done with certain of the labor element in the past. It
may well be that the time has come to stop and consider whether the
advantages gained are worth the price that is being paid, or whether
other devices, as for example, congressional or executive interven169. See pp. 10-12 supra.
170. Comment, 32 VA. L. REV. 677, 678 (1946).
171. Consider, for example, the resistance of the courts to legislative requirement of a jury
in contempt cases, supra page 21. This resistance is attributed by two writers to
energy with which men. judges included, seek power as power, and the personal weakness
sensitiveness of judges as human beings." Nelles and King, Contcmpt by Publication in
United States, 28 COL. L. RgV. 401, 525-544 (1928).
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tion to handle labor disputes affected with the public interest, or the
establishment of a separate system of labor courts with a technically
skilled body of labor judges,"' may not perhaps be employed to accomplish the desired results without placing this additional strain on
our civil judiciary. "'
It is worthy of note that the expansion of equity into the criminal
field has not gone without criticism,174 and that some of that criticism
has come from some of the staunchest defenders of the equity
courts.7 5 Apparently England and Canada have not found it necessary
to use the injunction as a means of enforcing their criminal laws; indeed, in England the early tentative. expansion of equity into the labor
field through the use of the injunction was quickly repudiated.' Perhaps one explanation of this fact is that the English people, with the
example of the abuses of the Court of Star Chamber before them, as
well as with a more deeply entrenched conception of the importance
of the jury, place a higher
value on the right to a jury trial than we
77
do in tL United States.
Much of the pressure for expansion of criminal equity comes not
because of lack of a criminal remedy but rather because of the failure
172. For recent articles by a federal judge and a United States senator advocating such courts,
see Knox, We Can and Must Have Industrial Peace, 165 COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL CHRONICLE
605 (1947); Ferguson, Why Not Labor Courts?, 143 AMERICAN MAGAZINE 21 (1947).
173. "Even though the court had jurisdiction to enjoin the coal strike (a strike in the bituminous
coal fields in 1919 during the unsettled period following World War I), the question still
remains whether that jurisdiction should have been exercised. Undoubtedly an emergency confronted the government, but if an injunction had been refused, there were alternative remedies
through legislative or executive action. The question deserves serious consideration, whether
such types of action are not more expedient than an injunction in the case of a huge industrial
dispute unaccompanied by violence . . . such action shifts a great and bitter dispute involving
masses of people and wide economic ramifications from appointive judges who rarely have
expert knowledge of such economic problems to the President, an elective official, clothed with
powers which enable him to treat this problem like other war problems, drawing on the extensive assistance of experts and enforcing his decision by methods which are not available
to courts. This shift relieves the Judiciary of a terrific strain which it is not well fitted to bear.
Under our constitutional system, the highly important task of adjusting conflicts between different portions of the system belongs to the courts. This task requires that the firmest confidence of
the people in the correctness and fairness of judicial decisions shall be maintained. There is a
genuine danger that this confidence will be shaken if the Attorney General calls on Judges who
are not equipped by long experience to solve difficult economic problems and who lack the
powers necessary to solve them finally and obtains from them summary remedies affecting the
industrial life of thousands. Perhaps eventually we shall establish Conciliation Courts fitted by
traininc and experience and the possession of powers not now conferred on a United States
District Court to settle great strikes to the satisfaction of all concerned. Until then, may it not
be wise to entrust such controversies to Congress or the President who are at least as able to
decide them as the courts, rather than cast a great burden on the Judiciary, which may
weaken its accomplishment of its customary and invaluable work?" Chafee, The Progress of the
Law, 1919-1920 34 HARV. L. REv. 388, 405 (1921). In evaluating Professor Chafee's suggestions
one should remember that Congress has never been particularly noted for the speed with which it
adjusts serious controversies, and that even if a strike were to assume such national stature as
to justify the intervention of the executive as parens patriae, the labor element might be
equally dissatisfied with executive action if the executive were to decide that the national welfare
required an order ending the strike, although it is true that in such case the "pressure" would
be shifted from the judiciary to the executive.
174. Chafee, supra note 173 (criticizing the use of the injunctions in the labor field); Mack, Revival of Criminal Equity, 16 HARV. L. REV. 389, 402-403 (1903); Simpson, Fifty Years of
American Equity, 50 HARV. L. REv. 171, 226-228 (1936).
175. E.g., Garrard Glenn. See note, page 1, supra.
176. Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott, 10 Ch. App. 142 (1875); see pp. 5-6, supra.
177. Thus in 1939, at the outbreak of World War II. trial by jury in civil cases was suspended by
the Administration of Justice (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1939, 2 & 3 Ggo. VI, c. 78, See.
A. in an effort to conserve manpower. As soon as the war was over both the bar and the public
commenced agitation for the restoration of the jury trial in civil cases, and as a result this right
was restored in 1947. (Administration of Justice (Emergency Provisions) Act (Expiry) Order,
1947, S. R. & 0. 1947 No. 404, Art. 2 and Schedule). The following comment on this restoration in 21 Aus. L. J. 13 (1947) is indicative of the attitude toward jury trials in the Australian Commonwealth: ". . . the quality which really recommends jury trial is not that some,
or even all lawyers prefer it,hut rather that litigants themselves are in general more satisfied
with the verdict of a jury than the reasoned decision of a legally trained judge. Confidence in
the administration of justice cannot be inspired by the legal profession alone and even a
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to enforce existing criminal laws properly. A great deal of this pressure could be removed by revising our criminal procedure and our
system of jury selection, so as to provide for speedier and surer enforcement of the criminal law.'
Meanwhile the position of the defendant in those fields that equity
has already taken over could be greatly improved by legislative or
constitutional enactments guaranteeing the defendant a right to a
jury trial at his election in those instances in which he is cited for
contempt of an injunction and the act complained of is also a crime.
This would assure him a determination of his guilt or innocence by a
jury which would judge him on the basis of his moral culpability
rather than by an equity judge, who is more likely to be swayed by
utilitarian concepts. 9 The institution of jury trial in such cases would
of course result in some delay in punishing offenders. It might, however, be better to pay the price of delay than to permit the continuance of the present practice of summary trials for such contempts.
There is another and perhaps'a greater danger in encouraging the
expansion of law enforcement by injunction, with its adjunct of summary punishment of crimes without trial by jury. By so doing we are
creating an effective weapon for use by a potential future American
dictator who might rise upon the growing pyramid of administrative bureaus. As one writer has put it, "Under . . . totalitarian policy,
injunctive law enforcement would no doubt increase vastly, . . . and
the Chancellor would become a lion under the throne of an American
Mussolini or Stalin."' 8 9 No doubt such an eventuality seems at present
remote in the United States, but the fact remains that by encouraging equitable encroachment into the field of criminal law we may be
laying the foundation for inequitable law enforcement of a sort that
could one day cause us to realize too late that we had indeed sold our
birthright for a mess of pottage.
disappointed litigant will generally feel more reconciled to his loss if it has been the result a
decision by his peers." See also Jacobs, Trial by Jury-Its Origin and Merits, 21 Aus. L. J. 462
(1948): "The more I see of trial by judge . . . the more highly I think of trial by jury."
Compare with this attitude the recommendation for the abolition of jury trials in civil cases
in the United States found in Clark and Shulman. Jury Trial in Civil Case--A Study in
Judicial Administration, 43 YALE L. J. 867 (1934); James. Trial by Jury and the New Rules of
Federal Procedure, 45 YALE L. J. 1022 (1936).
178. See notes 138, 140, supra.
179. "It is true that juries are inclined to be influenced by their feelings. In the words of Butler's
'Hudibras':
'Do not your juries give their verdict
As if they felt the cause, not heard it?'
Grim reasopers may consider this a demerit; but the man in the street thinks otherwise. Is it not
better that juries should be swayed by sympathy than that judges should be swayed by purely
technical or legal considerations? Jurymen will do a little wrong in order to do a great right.
They endeavor to do justice without regard to strict law. A judge, bound by precedent, must
tread the straight and narrow path." Jacobs, Trial by Jury-Its Origin and Merits, 21 Aus.
L. J. 462, 463 (1948).
180. Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 HARv. L. REv. 171, 251 (1936). For an example
of such misuse of a judge-manned court, see Mann, Totalitarian Justice: Trial of Bukharin
Rykov, Yagoda, et al., 24 A. B. A. J. 970 (1938). A more recent example of Commun it
perversion of justice was the trial of Cardinal Mindszenty in a Hungarian "People's Court".
See Time, Feb. 14, 1949, p. 32. At this point in our history we may do well to recall the words
of Alexander Hamilton: "Arbitrary impeachments, arbitrary methods of prosecuting pretended
offenses, and arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary convictions, have ever appeared to me to be
the great engines of judicial despotism . . . security for liberty", therefore, is found "in a Constitution which expressly establishes the trial by jury in criminal cases." THE FEDERALIST, No.
83, bk. 11, at 139. 151 .(Bourne ed. 1947).

